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Abstract—Information theoretic sparse attacks that min-
imize simultaneously the information obtained by the
operator and the probability of detection are studied in a
Bayesian state estimation setting. The attack construction
is formulated as an optimization problem that aims to
minimize the mutual information between the state vari-
ables and the observations while guaranteeing the stealth
of the attack. Stealth is described in terms of the Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between the distributions of the
observations under attack and without attack. To overcome
the difficulty posed by the combinatorial nature of a sparse
attack construction, the attack case in which only one
sensor is compromised is analytically solved first. The
insight generated in this case is then used to propose a
greedy algorithm that constructs random sparse attacks.
The performance of the proposed attack is evaluated in
the IEEE 30 Bus Test Case.
Index Terms—Data injection attacks, sparse attacks,
stealth, information theoretic security, probability of de-
tection
I. INTRODUCTION
State estimation enables efficient, scalable, and secure
operation of power systems [1]. Monitoring and control
processes are supported by Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems and more recently by ad-
vanced communication systems that acquire and transmit
observations to a state estimator [2]. This cyber layer
exposes the system to malicious attacks [3] that exploit
the vulnerabilities of the sensing and communication
infrastructure solutions. One of the main threats faced by
modern power systems are data injection attacks (DIAs)
[4] which alter the state estimate of the operator by
compromising the system observations. A large body
of literature is concerned with the case in which attack
detection is performed by a residual test [5] under
the assumption that state estimation is deterministic. In
that setting, constructing DIAs that require access to
a small set of observations yield sparse optimization
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procedures and the attack construction boils down to
solving optimization problems with sparsity constraints
[6]. Therein, it is shown that the operator can secure
a small fraction of observations to make the attack
construction significantly harder. This problem has been
studied extensively in the literature in both centralized
and decentralized scenarios [7], [8], [9], [10].
The unprecedented data acquisition capabilities in the
smart grid elevates the threat of attack precisely because
accurate stochastic models can be generated for the
system. In view of this, attack constructions that exploit
this prior knowledge can be posed within a Bayesian
framework [11], [12]. In this setting, the attack detection
problem is no longer cast as a residual test. Instead,
detection strategies consider the likelihood ratio test
[13] or alternatively machine learning methods [14]. The
operator produces a stochastic model of the system based
on the observations generated by the monitoring system.
Moreover, data analytics on the system depend on the
reliability of the observations that are used with a variety
of estimation, statistical and machine learning tools that
provide the operator with different insight. In view of
this, it is essential to assess attacks in fundamental terms
to understand the impact over a wide range of estimation
and data analysis paradigms.
Information theoretic attacks are first introduced in
[15] and then generalized in [16]. In this approach,
attack disruption is measured in terms of two information
measures: (a) the mutual information between the state
variables and the observations under attack; and (b)
the probability of detection, which is governed by the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. The advantage of
using these information measures is that the attack dis-
rupts a wide range of estimation, statistical and machine
learning methods that are available to the operator. Given
that the attack vector corrupts the observations in an
additive fashion, mutual information minimization yields
a Gaussian attack construction. In this case, mutual
information decreases monotonically with the variance
of the attack vector entries [17] and the converse holds
for the probability of attack detection. The information
theoretic attacks in [16] require that the attacker has
access to all the observations and incorporating sparsity
constraints with information theoretic attacks is still an
open problem that requires novel approaches. In this
paper, we present a novel information theoretic sparse
attack construction based on a greedy observation selec-
tion mechanism.
A brief description of notation follows. Consider ma-
trix A ∈ Rm×n, then (A)ij denotes the entry in row
i and column j. We denote by AI the matrix formed
with the rows of A ∈ Rm×n given by the indices in
I ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. We denote the complement of set I
by the usual Ic. The elementary vector ei is a vector
of zeros with a one in the i-th entry. Random variables
are denoted by capital letters and their realizations by
the correponding lower case, e.g. x is a realization of
the random variable X . Vectors of n random variables
are denoted by a superscript, e.g. Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn)
with corresponding realizations denoted by x. The set of
positive semidefinite matrices of size n × n is denoted
by Sn+.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Power system state estimation
In a power system the state vector x ∈ Rn containing
the voltages and angles at all the generation and load
buses describes the operation state of the system. State
vector x is observed by the acquisition function F :
R
n → Rm. A linearized observation model is considered
for state estimation, yielding the observation model
Y m = Hx+ Zm, (1)
where H ∈ Rm×n is the Jacobian of the linearized
system determined by the system components, the topol-
ogy of the network, and the operating point. The vector
containing observations Y m is corrupted by the additive
white Gaussian noise introduced by the sensors [1], [2].
The noise vector Zm follows a multivariate Gaussian
distribution Zm ∼ N (0, σ2Im), where σ2 is the noise
variance.
In a Bayesian estimation framework, the state vari-
ables are described by a vector of random variables Xn
with a given distribution. As the Gaussian distribution
has the maximum entropy among all distributions with
the same variance, we assume Xn follows a multivari-
able Gaussian distribution with zero mean and covari-
ance matrix ΣXX ∈ Sn+. From (1), it follows that the
vector of observations is zero mean and with covariance
matrix
ΣYY = HΣXXH
T + σ2Im. (2)
The resulting observations are corrupted by the mali-
cious attack vector Am. Given that the state variables are
denoted by a random vector Xn and the system noise is
Gaussian it is feasible to implement the stochastic attack
Am ∼ PAm , (3)
where PAm is the distribution of A
m. Since the Gaussian
distribution minimizes the mutual information between
the state variables and the compromised observations
subject to a fixed covariance matrix [17], we adopt a
Gaussian random attack framework given by
Am ∼ N (0,ΣAA), (4)
whereΣAA is the covariance matrix of attack vector A
m.
Consequently, the compromised observations denoted by
Y mA are given by
Y mA = HX
n + Zm +Am, (5)
where Y mA follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution
given by
Y mA ∼ N (0,ΣYAYA) (6)
with ΣYAYA = HΣXXH
T + σ2Im +ΣAA.
B. Attack Detection
As a part of a security strategy, the operator imple-
ments an attack detection procedure prior to performing
state estimation. Detection is cast as a hypothesis testing
problem given by:
H0 : There is no attack, (7)
H1 : Observations are compromised. (8)
In this setting, the optimal test is the likelihood ratio test
(LRT) [18] given by
L(y) =
fYm
A
(y)
fYm(y)
≷ τ, (9)
where y is the realization of the observations to be tested
for attack; fYm
A
(y) is the probability density function
(pdf) of Y mA in (5), fYm(y) is the pdf of Y
m in (1), and
τ ∈ R+ in (9) is the decision threshold. The performance
of the test is assessed in terms of the Type I error,
defined as α
∆
= P
[
L(Y¯ m) ≥ τ
]
with Y¯ m ∼ PYm , and
the Type II error, denoted by β
∆
= P
[
L(Y¯ m) < τ
]
with
Y¯ m ∼ PY m
A
. Note that the LRT is optimal, and therefore,
changing the value of τ is equivalent to changing the
tradeoff between Type I and Typer II errors.
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III. SPARSE INFORMATION-THEORETIC ATTACKS
A. Information-theoretic setting
The attack construction in [16] incorporates a detec-
tion constraint based on the KL divergence between the
distributions PY m
A
in (5) and PY m in (1) which results
in the construction of stealth attacks. Specifically, the
construction is given by the solution to the following
optimization problem:
min
PAm
I(Xn;Y mA ) + λD(PY mA ||PYm), (10)
where I(X ;Y ) is the mutual information between ran-
dom variables X and Y , D(P‖Q) denotes the KL
divergence between distributions P and Q, and λ ≥ 1
is the weighting parameter that determines the tradeoff
between attack disruption and probability of detection.
Note that the optimization in (10) searches for the
distribution of the attack vector of random variables
over the set of Gaussian multivariate distributions of
m dimensions, or equivalently, it chooses the optimal
covariance matrix for the distribution of the attack. It is
shown in [16] that the optimal Gaussian attack is given
by P¯Am = N (0, Σ¯) where
Σ¯ =
1
λ
HΣXXH
T. (11)
Note that in [16] the construction of the stealth attack
vector is not sparse, indeed all the components of the
attack realizations are nonzero with probability one, i.e.
P [|supp(Am)| = m] = 1. We define the support of the
attack vector Am by
supp(Am)
∆
= {i : P [Ai = 0] = 0} . (12)
B. Sparse attack formulation
Given that the operator is likely to have access control
policies in place [3], an attack construction that requires
access to all the observations is costly and unrealistic for
the attacker in most scenarios. For that reason, in the fol-
lowing we study stealth attack constructions that require
access to a limited number of sensors. In particular, we
pose the optimization problem with sparsity constraints
by considering distributions over the attack vector that
put non-zero mass on at most k ≤ m observation
indices. Thus, we include the additional requirement that
|supp(Am)| = k in the attack construction. In view of
this, the attacker chooses the distribution of the attack
vector over the set of multivariate Gaussian distributions
given by
Pk
∆
= {PAm : |supp(A
m)| = k} . (13)
The resulting k-sparse stealth attack construction is
therefore posed as the optimization problem:
min
PAm∈Pk
I(Xn;Y mA ) + λD(PY mA ||PY m). (14)
Solving this problem is hard in general owing to the
combinatorial nature of the attack vector support selec-
tion. For that reason, in Section IV we tackle the problem
by proposing a greedy attack construction algorithm that
results in k-sparse attack vectors.
C. Gaussian sparse attack construction
In the following, we particularize the attack construc-
tion in (14) by considering Gaussian distributed state
variables, i.e. Xn ∼ N (0,ΣXX), and assuming that the
attack vector follows the Gaussian distribution given in
(4). In this setting, the optimization problem in (14) is
equivalent [16] to the following optimization problem:
min
ΣAA∈Sm+
(1− λ) log |Im +WΣAA|
− log |σ2Im +ΣAA|+ λtr(WΣAA)),
(15)
where W
∆
= Σ−1YY . In order to incorporate sparsity
constraints in (15), the search space for the minimization
is constrained to the set of covariance matrices that
induces k-sparse support over the attack vectors, i.e., the
set given by
Sk
∆
=
{
S ∈ Sm+ : ‖diag(S)‖0 = k
}
, (16)
where diag(S) denotes the vector formed by the diagonal
entries of S. Solving (15) within the search domain
specified by (16) re-casts the equivalent k-sparse stealth
attack construction problem (14):
min
ΣAA∈Sk
(1− λ) log |Im +WΣAA|
− log |σ2Im +ΣAA|+ λtr(WΣAA)).
(17)
D. Optimal single observation attack case
Despite having narrowed it down to Gaussian dis-
tributions, the above optimization problem is still hard
and combinatorial in nature. For that reason, we first
tackle the case in which the attacker only comprises one
sensor, i.e. k = 1. The rationale for this is that we use
the insight developed for the single sensor case in the
construction of the general k-sparse case. The following
theorem provides the optimal solution for the case in
which the attacker corrupts a single sensor.
Theorem 1. The solution to the sparse stealth attack
construction problem in (17) for the case k = 1 is given
by
Σ¯AA = σ¯
2eαe
T
α, (18)
3
where
α = argmin
i
{(W)ii} , (19)
σ¯2= −
σ2
2
+
1
2
(
σ4 −
4(wσ2 − 1)
λw2
) 1
2
, (20)
with w
∆
= (W)αα.
Proof. We start by noting that for k = 1 the set of attack
covariance matrices is given by
S1
∆
=
⋃
i=1,...,m
{
S ∈ Sm+ : S = σ
2
i eie
T
i with σi ∈ R+
}
.
(21)
The covariance matrices in set S1 comprise matrices
with a single nonzero element in the diagonal entry i,
which denotes the index of the sensor that is attacked.
The corresponding entry σ2i denotes the variance of the
random variable used to attack observation i.
Let λ > 1 and restrict the optimization domain in
(17) to S1. Thus the resulting optimization problem is
equivalent to the following optimization problem:
min
σ¯
min
i
(1−λ) log(1+(W)iiσ¯
2)−log(σ2+σ¯2)+λ(W)iiσ¯
2.
(22)
We proceed by solving the inner part of the optimization
problem above. Consider the cost given by
f((W)ii)
∆
=(1− λ) log(1 + (W)iiσ¯
2)
− log(σ2 + σ¯2) + λ(W)iiσ¯
2, (23)
which is rewritten as
f(t) = λt− λ+ (1− λ) log t− log(σ2 + σ2i ), (24)
where t = 1 + (W)iiσ¯
2. It follows that (24) is convex
with respect to t because λt is a linear term and (1 −
λ) log t is convex in t for λ > 1. Therefore, f((W)ii)
is convex with respect to (W)ii and the minimum is
attained for (W)ii = −
1
λσ2i
. Since (W)ii > 0 the inner
minimization in (22) is equivalent to selecting the index i
that minimizes (W)ii. The definition of α and w follow
from this observation.
We now proceed to the outer optimization. In this case,
the cost is given by
g(r) = (1−λ) log(1+wr)− log(σ2 + r) +λwr, (25)
where r = σ2α. Noticing that the above function has a
single minimizer given by
r = −
σ2
2
+
1
2
(
σ4 −
4(wσ2 − 1)
λw2
) 1
2
(26)
completes the proof.
Algorithm 1 k-sparse stealth attack construction
Input: the observation matrix H, the covariance matrix
of the state variables ΣXX , the variance of the noise
σ2, and the weighting parameter λ
Output: the covariance matrix of the attack vector Σ¯AA
and the set of indices of attacked sensors A
1: Set A0 = {∅}
2: for j = 1 to k do
3: Set Hj = HAc
j−1
4: Compute Wj =
(
HjΣXXH
T
j + σ
2I|Acj−1|
)−1
5: Set αj = argmini {(Wj)ii}
6: Set wj = wαjαj
7: Set σ¯2j = −
σ2
2 +
1
2
(
σ4 −
4(wjσ
2−1)
λw2j
) 1
2
8: Set Aj = Aj−1 ∪ {αj}
9: end for
10: Set A = Ak
11: Set Σ¯AA =
∑
i∈A σ¯
2
i eie
T
i
IV. GREEDY CONSTRUCTION OF SPARSE ATTACKS
The extension to the k-sparse case of the solution
proposed in Section III-D does not get around the
combinatorial optimization in (17). For that reason, in
the following we propose a greedy construction that
leverages the insight distilled in the k = 1 case to select
the set of k attacked sensors. The construction is based
on a classical greedy procedure that sequentially selects
an observation to attack by maximizing the performance
in terms of the decision at each step. Let us denote
by A the set of observation indices that are attacked,
i.e. A
∆
= supp(Am). The greedy algorithm operates
by sequentially updating the entries in A by adding a
new index in each step until k indices are selected. For
that reason, the resulting entries of the attack vector are
independent, and therefore, the covariance matrix of the
attack vector obtained via the proposed greedy approach
belongs to the set
S˜k
∆
=
⋃
K
{
S ∈ Sm+ : S =
∑
i∈K
σ2i eie
T
i with σi ∈ R+
}
,
(27)
where the union is over all subsets K ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}
with |K| = k ≤ m. The proposed greedy construction is
described in Algorithm 1.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the simulation results on a
direct current (DC) state estimation setting for the IEEE
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Figure 1: Performance of the sparse attack in terms of
mutual information, probability of detection for different
values of λ when SNR = 30dB, ρ = 0.1, τ = 2 on the
IEEE 30 Bus Test Case.
30 Bus Test Case [19]. The voltage magnitudes are set
to 1.0 per unit, which implies that the state estimation is
based on the observations of active power flow injections
to all the buses and the active power flow between
physically connected buses. The Jacobian matrix H is
determined by the reactances of the branches and the
topology of the system. MATPOWER [20] is adopted
to generate H. To capture the statistical dependence
between the state variables we adopt a Toeplitz model
for the covariance matrix ΣXX that arises in a wide
range of practical settings, such as autoregressive sta-
tionary processes. Specifically, we model the correlation
between state variables Xi and Xj with the exponential
decay parameter ρ that results in (ΣXX)ij = ρ
|i−j| with
i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
In this setting, the performance of the proposed sparse
stealth attack is a function of the correlation parameter
ρ, noise variance σ2, and the topology of the system
as described by H. We define the signal to noise ratio
(SNR) as
SNR
∆
= 10 log10
(
tr(HΣXXH
T)
mσ2
)
. (28)
The results in this section are obtained by averaging
2× 104 realizations of the observations as described
in (5). Fig. 1 depicts the mutual information and the
probability of detection that the attack constructed via
Algorithm 1 induces for different values of the number
of compromised observations and the weighting param-
eter λ. As expected, the mutual information decreases
monotonically, approximately linearly with the num-
ber of compromised observations, while the probability
of detection increases monotonically. Interestingly, the
probability of detection exhibits an abrupt increase that
suggests a threshold effect when a critical number of
compromised observations is reached. The weighting
parameter λ governs the minimum achievable probability
of detection, e.g. a probability of detection of 10−2 is
not attainable when λ = 2. Indeed, increasing the value
of λ to 30 yields a smaller probability of detection for
small values of k but the threshold effect takes place
for the same number of compromised observations, for
both values of λ. This suggests that the topology of the
system governs the position of the threshold.
The variance of the random variables used to attack
each sensor, the probability of detection, and the prob-
ability of false alarm as a function of the number of
compromised observations are illustrated in Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3 for λ = 2 and λ = 30, respectively. As shown in
Theorem 1, λ is a scaling factor on the variances of the
attack vector, and therefore, the values of the variance
for the case λ = 2 are simply scaled in the case λ = 30.
There are two distinguishable attack regimes depend-
ing on the variance of the attack vector entries. Algo-
rithm 1 does not yield a monotonically decreasing profile
of variances. Instead the variance of the entries selected
by the algorithm switches between small and large values
as the number of compromised observations increases.
This suggests, that certain entries are significantly more
sensitive to additive attack than others and the existence
of more vulnerable sensors that are determined by the
topology of the system, as shown in (20).
For both cases, the probability of false alarm exhibits
non-monotonic behavior with the number of compro-
mised observations, and interestingly, the change in
monotonicity coincides with the threshold.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed an information-theoretic sparse
attack construction within a smart grid Bayesian state
estimation framework. The proposed attack construction
minimizes the mutual information between the state
variables in the smart grid and the observations obtained
by the operator while minimizing the probability of
detection. To that end, we have proposed a cost function
that combines the mutual information and the KL diver-
gence that is amenable to sparse attack constructions. We
have theoretically characterized the single observation
attack case by proving that the resulting cost function is
convex and obtaining the optimal attack construction for
this case. We distill the insight obtained from the single
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Figure 2: Variance of the attack vector entries, proba-
bility of detection, and probability of false alarm of the
sparse attack when λ = 2, SNR = 30 dB, ρ = 0.1, τ = 2
on the IEEE 30 Bus Test Case.
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Figure 3: Variance of the attack vector entries, proba-
bility of detection, and probability of false alarm of the
sparse attack when λ = 30, SNR = 30 dB, ρ = 0.1, τ =
2 on the IEEE 30 Bus Test Case.
observation case to propose a sparse attack construction
via a greedy algorithm that overcomes the combinatorial
challenge posed by the observation selection problem.
We have numerically assessed the performance of the
proposed attack in the IEEE 30 Bus Test Case and
observed that the probability of detection exhibits a
threshold effect when a critical number of observations
are compromised.
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